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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

BRANDON MICHAEL GIBBONS,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

:

Case No. 20070785-CA

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a final judgment of the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, the Honorable William W. Barrett, presiding. The Utah Court of
Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code section 78A-4-103(2)(j)
(2008), whereby the supreme court may transfer jurisdiction to the court of appeals for an
appeal taken from a final judgment of conviction for a first degree or capital felony. See
Utah Code Ann. 78A-4-103(2)(j) (2008). Appellant Brandon Gibbons was convicted of
aggravated kidnapping, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code section 76-5-302,
and sentenced to fiftecn-years-to-life in the Utah State Prison. See Utah Code Ann, § 765-302(2008).
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
I.

Issue: Whether The Trial Court Erred by Failing to Make a Determination of
Accuracy and Relevancy on the Record Regarding Mr. Gibbons's Presentence
Investigation Report.

Preservation: This issue was preserved at Mr. Gibbons's sentencing hearing,
when trial counsel brought two alleged inaccuracies in the sentencing report to the
trial court's attention. R. 90:3-4. If, however, this court concludes that this issue
was not preserved, it may review the issue for plain error.
Standard of Review: '"Whether the trial court properly complied with a legal
duty to resolve on the record the accuracy of contested information in the
sentencing reports is a question of law that we review for correctness.'" State v.
Scott, 2008 UT App 68, H 5, 180 P.3d 774 (quoting State v. Maroncy, 2004 UT
App 206,1| 23, 94 P.3d 295). Alternatively,
11 jo demonstrate plain error, a defendant must establish that
"(i) [a]n error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious
to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the
error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable
outcome for the appellant, or phrased differently, [the court's]
confidence in the verdict is undermined."
State v. Holgatc, 2000 UT 74, «,[ 13, 10 P.3d 346 (alteration in original) (quoting
State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah.1993)).
II.

Issue: Whether the Trial Court Imposed an Illegal Sentence or Committed Plain
Error by Relying on Irrelevant and Inaccurate Information at Sentencing.
Preservation: Because this allegation involves an illegal sentence, this court has
jurisdiction to review this claim at any time, even if the illegal sentence is first
claimed of on appeal. Sec Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e); State v. Samora, 2004 UT 79,
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fflf 23-24, 99 P.3d 858. Alternatively, this court can review this claim for plain
error. See Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ^f 13.
Standard of Review: Claims regarding illegal sentences present questions of law
thai the appellate court reviews for correctness. See State v. Thorkclson, 2004 UT
App 9, *!! 9, 84 P.3d 854. The plain error standard of review is described above.
Issue: Whether the Trial Court Violated Mr. Gibbons's Due Process Rights and
Thereby Abused its Discretion by Failing to Consider Aggravating and Mitigating
Circumstances or State its Reasons, on the Record, for Imposing the Maximum
Sentence.
Preservation: This issue was preserved at Mr. Gibbons's sentencing hearing,
when trial counsel asked the court to consider mitigating circumstances and
impose a sentence of six-years-to-life. R. 90:4-8, 10. See State v. Valdez, 2008
UT App 329,1| 6, 194 P.3d 195 (holding that defendant's challenge on appeal that
the trial court "failed to consider all legally relevant factors" at sentencing was
preserved when trial counsel asked for the trial court to impose concurrent terms
and the defendant was not "required to repeatedly raise the objection").
While this argument was preserved at sentencing, this court may also
consider this issue under rule 22(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure or
plain error. Under rule 22(e), an appellate court can correct an illegal sentence or
a sentence imposed in an illegal manner at any time, regardless of whether the
illegality is first claimed of on appeal. See Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e); Samora, 2004
UT 79, ^| 12. A sentence is illegal if, among other things, it is imposed in violation

of the defendant's due process rights or rule 22(a) of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure. See Samora, 2004 UT 79, ^ 23-24.
Standard of Review: Claims regarding illegal sentences present questions of law
that the appellate court reviews for correctness. See Thorkclson, 2004 UT App 9,
<J| 9. Further, the court of appeals "reviewfs] sentences for abuse of discretion. 'An
abuse of discretion may be manifest if the actions of the judge in sentencing were
inherently unfair or if the judge imposed a clearly excessive sentence."1 Valdcz,
2008 UT App 329, ^ 4 (citation omitted) (quoting State v. Elm, 808 P.2d 1097,
1099 (Utah 1991)). And finally, under plain error, the defendant must establish
that there was an error, the error should have been obvious to the trial court, and
the error was harmful. See Holgate, 2000 UT 74, H 13.
IV.

Issue: Whether the Trial Court Imposed an Excessive Sentence in Violation of
State and Federal Constitutional Law.
Standard of Review: This court can review this allegation for plain error or
exceptional circumstances. "When a party fails to preserve an issue for appeal,
[the appellate court] will address the issue only if (1) the appellant establishes that
the district court committed plain error, [or] (2) exceptional circumstances exist."
State v. Low, 2008 UT 58,1| 19, 192 P.3d 867 (internal quotation marks omitted).
TEXT OF RELEVANT STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL
PROVISIONS

The following constitutional provisions and statutes are attached in addendum A:
United States Constitution, Amendment VIII, Amendment XIV. Section 1;
Utah Constitution, Article 1, Section 7; Article 1, Section 9;
4

Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah

R. Crim. P. 22(e);
Code Section 76-3-201 (2008);
Code Section 76-3-201 (2003);
Code Section 76-5-302 (2008);
Code Section 77-18-1 (2008).

Addendum 13: Sentencing transcript;
Addendum C: Judgment
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On February 26, 2008, Defendant Brandon Gibbons was charged with aggravated
robbery, aggravated kidnapping, and aggravated assault. R. 7. During subsequent
negotiations, Mr. Gibbons agreed to plead guilty to aggravated kidnapping and the State
dismissed the two remaining charges. R. 63. On July 1, 2008, Mr. Gibbons pleaded
guilty to one count of aggravated kidnapping, and the trial court ordered adult probation
and parole (AP&P) to prepare a presentence investigation report (PSI). R. 67-68.
At Mr. Gibbons's sentencing hearing, defense counsel pointed out two alleged
errors in the PSI. R. 90:3-4. However, the trial court failed to inquire as to the accuracy
or relevancy of the alleged errors and it failed to make any findings on the record. Id.
Defense counsel also presented several mitigating factors and asked the trial court to
impose a sentence of six-years-to-life, one of three sentences allowed by law. R. 90:4.
In lieu of the prosecution making any sentencing recommendations, the victim addressed
the court. The victim argued against cither of the two lesser sentences allowed by statute
and asked the judge to impose the maximum sentence of fiftecn-ycars-to-life. R. 90: 910. At the close of the victim impact statement, the trial court sentenced Mr. Gibbons to
fiftcen-years-to-life. See R. 90:11.
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Mr. Gibbons appeals, arguing first, that the trial court erred by failing to correct
the PSI inaccuracies on the record. Second, the trial court imposed an illegal sentence in
violation of Mr. Gibbon's right to due process because it relied on unreliable and
irrelevant information in fixing a sentence. Third, the trial court violated Mr. Gibbons's
due process rights and imposed sentence in an illegal manner because it failed to weigh
aggravating and mitigating circumstances and state its reasons, on the record, for
imposing the maximum sentence. And fourth, the trial court violated Mr. Gibbons's
constitutional rights by imposing an excessive sentence. As a consequence, this court
should vacate Mr. Gibbons's sentence and remand for additional proceedings.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On July 1, 2008, Brandon Gibbons pleaded guilty to one count of aggravated
kidnapping, a first degree felony. Sec R. 59. The plea stems from an episode on January
21, 2008, during which Mr. Gibbons "knowingly detained Alana Heaps | |in her vehicle! I
and asked her to drive . . . to an ATM | Jagainsl her willf to retrieve forty dollars,] while
showing her that fhcj had a broken bottle," R. 60.
Mr. Gibbons was originally charged with aggravated robbery, aggravated
kidnapping, and aggravated assault. See R. 7. During plea negotiations, he agreed to
plead guilty to aggravated kidnapping and the State agreed to drop the two remaining
charges. See R. 63. The trial court accepted Mr. Gibbons's plea and ordered a PSI.
At sentencing, trial counsel called the court's attention to two errors in the PSI:
First, trial counsel pointed out that the PSI incorrectly stated that Mr. Gibbons had two
previous felony convictions when in fact Mr. Gibbons had none. See R. 3. Second, the
6

PSI incorrectly noted that Mr. Gibbons was "proud" about pleading a prior felony charge
down to a misdemeanor, when in actuality Mr. Gibbons communicated to AP&P that he
was proud of having completed a drug rehabilitation program. See R. 90:4.
Trial counsel then presented several mitigating circumstances including the fact
that Mr. Gibbons has no prior felonies and no violent past, he has fully acknowledged
criminal responsibility for his actions, and he has a loving and supportive family who
describe him as a caring, kind, and compassionate person who does not behave like this
when he is not under the influence of drugs. R. 90:6-7. Trial counsel further explained
that Mr. Gibbons grew up in a structured home environment, excelled in church and
scouting activities, but unfortunately, at around age sixteen fell into a bad crowd and
since then, has had an extensive drug problem. R. 90:7. This criminal episode resulted
from the fact that Mr. Gibbons was acting in "sort of dope sick desperation," and his
intention was not to harm anyone but to get forty or fifty dollars for drugs. See R. 90:57, 10. Based on these mitigating factors as well as Mr. Gibbons's extensive family
support, trial counsel requested that the court sentence Mr. Gibbons to six-years-to-life in
prison as opposed to the other options in the aggravated kidnapping statute: ten-years-tolife or fifteen-years-to-life. R. 90:7.
After trial counsel concluded, the victim spoke to the court. She explained how
the crime has negatively affected her and she asked the court to impose the maximum
penalty. R. 90:9-10. She also stated that she could have taken Mr. Gibbons to drug
treatment or the hospital instead of to an ATM, had he asked her to, and she commented
on the plea bargain, explaining that she had a "really hard time thinking that there was
7

three charges, [and he is j pleading to one. The reason he is pleading to that one is
because I didn't agree—I said we'll go to trial if he doesn't plead to that one." R. 90:9-10.
At the close of the victim's statement, the judge stated that he was "glad [the victim] came
in because it makes a big difference . . . . I'm going to sentence him to an indeterminate
term of 15 years to life . . . ." R. 90:11. The judge did not provide any statements
regarding the aggravating and mitigating circumstances or why he was imposing the
maximum penalty allowed by law. R. 90:11. Mr. Gibbons appeals.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Under Utah Code section 77-18-1(6) (a), once trial counsel brings alleged errors in
the PSI to the trial court's attention, the court has an obligation to make a determination
of accuracy on the record. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(6) (a) (2008). Where the trial
court has failed to fulfill this duty, this court has remanded for a hearing and opportunity
for the trial court to make the appropriate findings. In this instance, defense counsel
brought two alleged errors to the trial court's attention, yet the trial court failed to make
findings of reliability and relevancy on the record. Consequently, this court should
remand Mr. Gibbons's case to the trial court for additional proceedings consistent with
Utah Code section 77-18-1(6) (a).
This court should also vacate Mr. Gibbons's sentence because it was based on
unreliable and irrelevant information. "Under both the United States and the Utah State
Constitutions, due process requires criminal proceedings including sentencing to be based
upon accurate and reasonably reliable information." State v. Weeks, 2000 UT App 273, ^[
8, 12 P.3d 110, affd, 2002 UT 98, 61 P.3d 1000; see also U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1;
.'
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Utah Const. Art. 1, § 7. Where a sentence is not so based, it is illegal and must be
vacated. See Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e); State v. Wanosik, 2001 UT App 241, ffl| 34-38, 31
P.3d 615. ajTd, 2003 UT 46, 79 P.3d 937. In this case, Mr. Gibbons's sentence is illegal
because it was based on inaccurate information in the PSI and irrelevant information
provided in the victim impact statement.
Also, notwithstanding the Utah Supreme Court's holding in State v. Helms, 2002
UT 12, 40 P.3d 626, and the newly crafted aggravated kidnapping statute, the trial court
violated Mr, Gibbons's right to due process and thereby abused its discretion because it
failed to consider aggravating and mitigating circumstances and state its reasons, on the
record, for imposing the maximum sentence. Thus, this court should vacate Mr.
Gibbons's sentence and remand for additional proceedings. See Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e).
Finally, the trial court imposed a sentence in violation of the Eighth Amendment
to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 9 of the Utah Constitution because
the sentence is disproportionate to the offense committed and it shocks the moral
conscience.
ARGUMENT
I.

The Trial Court Erred at Sentencing by Failing to Correct Mr.
Gibbons's PSI on the Record

The trial court erred at sentencing by failing to correct Mr. Gibbons's PSI on the
record. Utah Code section 77-18-1 explains that once an attorney brings an error in the
PSI to the trial court's attention, the court has an obligation to determine the relevancy
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and accuracy of the alleged errors on the record. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(6) (a)
(2008). More specifically, the statute states that
[a]ny alleged inaccuracies in the presentence investigation
report, which have not been resolved by the parties and the
department prior to sentencing, shall be brought to the
attention of the sentencing judge, and the judge may grant an
additional ten working days to resolve the alleged
inaccuracies of the report with the department. If after ten
working days the inaccuracies cannot be resolved, the court
shall make a determination of relevance and accuracy on the
record.
Id (emphasis added); sec also State v. Scott, 2008 UT App 68, ^ 8, 180 P.3d 774
(explaining that trial court has a statutory obligation to correct the alleged PSI errors on
the record). The Utah Supreme Court has previously explained that compliance with
section 77-18-1 (6) (a) "requires the sentencing judge to consider the party's objections to
the report, make findings on the record as to whether the information objected to is
accurate, and determine on the record whether that information is relevant to the issue of
sentencing." State v. Jaeger, 1999 UT 1, If 44, 973 P.2d 404; sec also State v. Maroncy,
2004 UT App 206, ]\ 26, 94 P.3d 295. Where the trial court has failed to fulfill this
obligation, this court has remanded the defendant's case to the trial court for additional
proceedings. Sec Jaeger, 1999 Ul 1, H 45; Scott, 2008 UT App 68, ^ 15; Maroncy, 2004
UT App 206, €,| 29.
In this case, defense counsel brought two alleged inaccuracies to the trial court's
attention: (1) that the PSI erroneously indicated that Mr. Gibbons had two prior felony
convictions, when in actuality, he had none; and (2) that the PSI erroneously indicated
that Mr. Gibbons was proud of having had a prior felony charge reduced to a
10

misdemeanor, when Mr, Gibbons communicated that he was proud of having completed
a drug rehabilitation program. Sec R. 90:4. Notwithstanding defense counsel's effort to
bring these errors to the trial court's attention, the trial court failed to make findings and
resolve the inaccuracies on the record. Sec generally, R. 90.
Although trial counsel stated, after he brought the errors to the court's attention,
that "(hose two corrections were in place," R. 90:4, trial counsel's statement did not
relieve the court of its obligation to address the errors on the record. See Utah Code Ann.
§ 77-18-l(6)(a) (2008). As Utah Code section 77-18-1 explains, a defendant waives his
right to have errors in the PSI corrected if he fails to bring the alleged errors to the court's
attention. Sec id. § 77-18-1 (6)(b) ("If a party fails to challenge the accuracy of the
presentence investigation report at the time of sentencing, that matter shall be considered
to be waived."). However, once the errors have been raised, the onus is on the trial court
to make a determination on the record. Sec id. § 77-18-1 (6)(a) (stating that once an error
has been brought to the court's attention, the court "shall make a determination of
relevance and accuracy on the record" (emphasis added)); Jaeger, 1999 UT 1, ^ 44. Thus,
defense counsel did not waive the right to have the court determine the accuracy of the
objections on the record and the trial court erred by failing to fulfill its obligation under
Utah Code section 77-18-l(6)(b).
In the alternative, it was plain error for the trial court to proceed without correcting
the alleged inaccuracies. As previously explained, the trial court erred by failing to
comply with section 77-18-(l)(6)(b). This error was should have been obvious to the
trial court because the law regarding Utah Code section 77-18-l(6)(a) was clear at the
11

time of Mr. Gibbons's sentence. See Jaeger, 1999 UT 1, ^j 44; see also State v. Frausto,
2002 UT App 259, If 22, 53 P.3d 486 ("Defendant must still show under the plain error
standard that this error should have been obvious, meaning that the law was clear at the
time of trial" (internal quotation marks omitted)). And the error was harmful.
The error was harmful because it likely contributed to a harsher sentence, could
affect the length of Mr. Gibbons's incarceration, and created a permanent, yet incorrect,
record that will be utilized by the Board of Pardons and in any future criminal
proceedings. See Labrum v. Board of Pardons, 870 P.2d 902, 903-04 (Utah 1993)
(describing indeterminate sentencing procedures, sentencing matrix and guidelines, and
parole and probation proceedings). More specifically, because AP&P erroneously
indicated that Mr. Gibbons has two prior felony convictions, he received a higher score
on his AP&P assessment, and thus, fell higher along the sentencing guideline matrix than
was necessary. Sec id.; R. 79, PSI Sentencing Matrix. Mr. Gibbons's individualized
matrix, which is attached to his PSI, will follow him through his term of imprisonment,
and if not corrected could negatively influence the length of his incarceration, including
whether he is eligible for parole. See id. Thus, the alleged error was prejudicial.
Consequently, this court should remand Mr. Gibbons's case to the trial court for
additional proceedings consistent with Utah Code section 77-18-1(6) (a).
II.

The Trial Court Imposed an Illegal Sentence In Violation of Mr.
Gibbons's Right to Due Process Because the Court Based its
Sentencing Decision on Unreliable and Irrelevant Information

The trial court imposed an illegal sentence because it relied on unreliable
information in the PSI and irrelevant information provided through the victim impact
12

statement. "The due process clause of Article 1, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution,
requires that a sentencing judge act on reasonably reliable and relevant information in
exercising discretion in fixing a sentence." State v. IIowcll, 707 P.2d 115, 118 (Utah
1985). "'A sentence in a criminal case should be appropriate for the defendant in light of
his background and the crime committed and also serve the interests of society which
underlie the criminal justice system.'" State v. Wanosik, 2001 UT App 241, <[| 34, 31 P.3d
615, affd, 2003 UT 46, 79 P.3d 937 (quoting State v. Mclcndon, 611 P.2d 728, 729 (Utah
1980)). Where a sentence is not based on reliable and relevant information regarding the
defendant's background and the crime committed, it is considered illegal and must be
vacated. See id. at ^ ] 36-39. In this case, Mr. Gibbons's sentence is illegal because the
trial court relied on unreliable information in the PSI and irrelevant information provided
during the victim impact statement. Thus, this court should vacate Mr. Gibbons's
sentence and remand for resentencing.
A. The PSI
As previously discussed, the PSI contained significant errors, which the trial court
failed to correct at sentencing. For example, Mr. Gibbons's PSI erroneously indicated the
he had two prior felony convictions, where he actually had none. R. 90:3. The PSI also
erroneously indicated that Mr. Gibbons was proud of having pleaded a felony down to a
misdemeanor, when in fact, he communicated he was proud of having gone through a
rehabilitation program. Without a sentencing statement limiting the court's sentencing
decision to reliable and accurate information, this court can only presume that the trial
court based its sentencing decision on the inaccurate information, thereby imposing an
13

illegal sentence. See State v. Weeks, 2000 UT App 273, Tf 8, 12 P.3d 110, aff d, 2008 UT
98, 61 P.3d 1000 ("Under both the United States and the Utah State Constitutions, due
process requires criminal proceedings including sentencing to be based upon accurate and
reasonably reliable information.").
In the event that this court finds that this error was not preserved, it can conclude
that the trial court plainly erred by sentencing Mr. Gibbons without correcting the alleged
errors in the PSI. As previously discussed, the trial court erred by failing to determine the
accuracy of the PSI. The error should have been obvious to the trial court because the
law clearly required the court to make relevance and accuracy findings on the record.
See State v. Jaeger, 1999 UT 1, 1| 44, 973 P.2d 404. The error was harmful because it
resulted in a higher score on Mr. Gibbons's sentencing matrix and most likely influenced
the trial court's decision to impose the maximum sentence. S^e Labrum v. Board of
Pardons, 870 P.2d 902, 903-04 (Utah 1993); R. 79, PSI Sentencing Matrix.
Alternatively, however, this court can presume prejudice because it violates Mr.
Gibbons's due process rights to have his sentence based on unreliable and inaccurate
information. See Wanosik, 2001 UT App 241, ^ 34; Weeks, 2000 UT App 273, ^ 8.
"The fair administration of justice at the least requires that the information upon which
the judge relies in imposing punishment is accurate." State v. Lipsky, 608 P.2d 1241,
1249 (Utah 1980). Where erroneous information is before the court, and the court fails to
advance a sentencing statement explaining exactly which information it relied on at
sentencing, this court can only conclude that the trial court relied on all of the information
before it, including the inaccurate information. Thus, this court can conclude that there
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was an error, it should have been obvious to the trial court, and the error was harmful to
Mr. Gibbons.

B, The Victim Impact Statement
Additionally, the trial court was persuaded by the victim impact statement, which
improperly shifted the focus at sentencing to irrelevant information. While crime victims
in Utah arc entitled to address the court, the overarching requirement is that the court
bases its sentencing decisions on reliable and relevant information. See State v. Wanosik,
2001 U T A p p 2 4 1 , l | 3 4 , 31 P.3d 615, affd, 2003 UT 46, 79 P.3d 937. Further, the victim
impact statute suggests that courts may limit victim impact statements "to matters that are
relevant to the proceeding." Utah Code Ann. § 77-38-4(5) (2008). And in defining
victim impact statements to be contained in the PSI, the Utah Code explains that they
should describe matters regarding restitution, if any, and matters related to "the impact of
the offense upon the victim or the victim's family." IcL Utah Code Ann. § 77-3 8a203(1 )(a)(vii) (2008). It follows then, that victim impact statements should be confined
to (or courts should only rely on parts of the statement pertaining to) matters relevant to
the proceeding, and more specifically, to matters regarding how the crime has impacted
the victim and his or her family. Cf. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 830 n.2, (1991)
(leaving intact that aspect of Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987), which held that
during a capital penalty proceeding, "the admission of a victim's family members'
characterizations and opinions about the crime, the defendant, and the appropriate
sentence violates the Eighth Amcndment"(emphasis added)).
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During her statement, the victim argued for the trial court to impose a sentence of
fiftecn-ycars-to-life on the basis that Mr. Gibbons had two other charges dismissed
during plea negotiations, which she participated in. More precisely, she stated that she
had "a really hard time thinking that there was three charges, pleading to one. The reason
he plead to that one is because I didn't agree—I said we'll go to trial if he doesn't plead to
that one." R. 90:10. The proceeding was further tainted with irrelevant and unreliable
information because the victim stated that Mr. Gibbons had other options during the
crime, i.e., Mr. Gibbons could have asked her to take him to a drug rehabilitation
program or to the hospital, and she mentioned facts that Mr. Gibbons had not admitted to
and that were not in the record, i.e., that they "picked up his friend." R. 90:9.
The difficulty surrounding victim impact statements is that the court must
balance the victim's right to be heard with the need to confine the defendant's sentencing
proceeding to matters that are relevant and reliable. By referring to matters outside of the
plea agreement and specifics of the negotiations, however, the balance tipped in favor of
the victim and Mr. Gibbons was harmed. This is especially so because the victim
referred to facts not in evidence without any way for Mr. Gibbons to challenge the
reliability of her statements. See State v. Weeks. 2000 U f App 273, M 8, 12 P.3d 110
("[ Fundamental principles of procedural fairness in sentencing require that a defendant
have the right to examine and challenge the accuracy and reliability of the factual
information upon which his sentence is based." (emphasis added) (internal quotation
marks omitted)). Further, the court clearly relied on these irrelevant statements, thereby
imposing an illegal sentence. For example, at the close of the victim's statement, the
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court stated that it was "glad she came in because it makes a big difference." R. 90:11.
Without any additional explanation, the court then pronounced the maximum sentence.
Id. Because the court failed to indicate that it was basing its sentencing decision on
anything other than the inaccurate and irrelevant information that was before it, the court
violated Mr. Gibbons's due process and imposed an illegal sentence.
In the alternative, this court can conclude that the trial court committed plain error
by relying on the irrelevant comments in the victim impact statement. It was error for the
trial court to rely on irrelevant comments because, as mentioned, the due process clauses
of the state and federal constitutions require the trial court to base its sentencing decision
on reliable and accurate information. See State v. Wanosik, 2001 UT App 241, ^] 34, 31
P.3d 615, afiM, 2003 UT 46, 79 P.3d 937; State v. Lipsky, 608 P.2d 1241, 1249 (Utah
1980); Weeks, 2000 UT App 273, *[[ 8. Further, this error should have been obvious to
the trial court because the law was well settled at the time Mr. Gibbons's sentencing
proceeding occurred. In other words, it was clear at the time of trial that the court should
only base Mr. Gibbons's sentence or relevant and reliable information. Sec Wanosik,
2001 UT App 241, ^f 34. And finally, Mr. Gibbons was prejudiced by the error because,
as just explained, the court was clearly persuaded by the victim's statement when
announcing sentence.
In summary, because the trial court based its sentencing decision on unreliable
information in the PSI and irrelevant information in the victim impact statement, the trial
court violated Mr. Gibbons's due process rights and imposed an illegal sentence. This
court can also conclude that the trial court committed plain error by imposing an illegal
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sentence. Under either scenario, this court should vacate Mr. Gibbons's sentence and
remand for additional proceedings.

III.

Mr. Gibbons's Sentence Should Be Vacated Because the Trial Court
Violated His Due Process Rights and Abused its Discretion at
Sentencing By Failing to Provide a Sentencing Statement

Notwithstanding State v. Helms, 2002 UT 12, 40 P.3d 626, and the newly crafted
amendments to the aggravated kidnapping statute and the mandatory minimum
sentencing procedures, this court should vacate Mr. Gibbons's sentence and remand for
new proceedings because the trial court entered sentence in an illegal manner. "Under
both the United States and the Utah State Constitutions, due process requires criminal
proceedings including sentencing to be based upon accurate and reasonably reliable
information." State v. Weeks, 2000 UT App 273, ^ 8, 12 P.3d 110, afTd, 2002 UT 98, 61
P.3d 1000; sec also U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1, Utah Const. Art. 1, § 7. In keeping
with this idea. "| fundamental principles ofproccdural fairness in sentencing require that
a defendant have the right to examine and challenge the accuracy and reliability of the
factual information upon which his sentence is based." Weeks, 2000 UT App 273, ^ 8
(alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). Where these due process
protections are not adhered to, the sentence imposed is illegal—or imposed in an illegal
manner

and this court must correct it. Sec State v. Wanosik, 2001 U f App 241, ^ 34,

31 P.3d 615, affd, 2003 UT 46, 79 P.3d 937. In this instance, the trial court violated Mr.
Gibbons's due process rights and imposed an illegal sentence because it failed to explain
its basis for choosing one of three available sentences, thereby leaving Mr. Gibbons
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without any way to challenge the accuracy and reliability of the information on which his
sentence is based, and leaving this court without the ability to exercise meaningful review
to determine whether the court abused its discretion by imposing the maximum penalty
allowed by law.
A. State v. Helms is Inapplicable.
In Helms, the Utah Supreme Court explained that it will "'upholdfj the trial
court)'s sentencing decision] even if it failed to make findings on the record whenever it
would be reasonable to assume that the court actually made such findings.'" Helms, 2002
UT 12,1| 11 (quoting State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219, 1234 (Utah 1997)). However,
the court further explained that there are three situations in which "this assumption should
not be made," including circumstances "where . . . an ambiguity of facts makes the
assumption unreasonable, . . . or . . . a prior case states that findings on an issue must be
made." Id at % 11 (emphasis added). In this instance, the Helms assumption does not
apply because there were significant inaccuracies and irrelevant information before the
court at sentencing, creating an ambiguity of facts.
Because these errors were explained at length in Parts I and II of this brief, they
will not be reiterated in this section. Nonetheless, the significant inaccuracies in Mr.
Gibbons's PSI and the irrelevant information provided through the victim impact
statement, coupled with the trial court's limited comments at sentencing, make it
inappropriate to assume that the trial court made sufficient findings of fact prior to
advancing Mr. Gibbons's sentence. Put another way, where the trial court has such
inaccurate and irrelevant information before it at sentencing, and it fails to advance a
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statement clarifying which information it is relying on, the appellate court can only
presume that the court relied on the inaccurate and irrelevant information and thereby
imposed a sentence in violation of the defendant's due process rights. See U.S. Const.
amend. XIV, § 1; Utah Const. Art. 1, § 7; Weeks, 2000 UT App 273, U 8;. Because that
is exactly what happened in this case, the Helms assumption docs not apply.
In addition, the Helms assumption docs not apply because prior case law regarding
due process at sentencing requires specific findings under the newly crafted aggravated
kidnapping statute. As will be explained below, while our state and constitutional due
process case law does not explicitly require findings at sentencing, due process principals
advanced through that case law does, especially in circumstances such as this one where
there is inaccurate and irrelevant information before the court, the court has broad
discretion to impose three different sentences, and the court's only explanation at
sentencing reveals that it was persuaded by the victim impact statement, which contained
irrelevant and inaccurate information.
B. Under the New Sentencing Scheme, Due Process Requires the Trial Court to
State Its Reasons, On the Record, For Imposing a Particular Sentence
In the absence of the Helms assumption, this court should vacate Mr. Gibbons's
sentence because the trial court violated his due process rights by failing to identify
mitigating and aggravating circumstances and state its reasons on the record for imposing
a sentence of fiftccn-ycars-to-lifc. This is so even in light of the newly crafted
amendments to the aggravated kidnapping statute and the mandatory minimum
sentencing procedures.
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In 2007, the Utah State Legislature passed the Penalties for Sexual Offenses and
Kidnapping Bill and, among other things, amended the sentencing language in the
aggravating kidnapping statute. Sec Penalties for Sexual Offenses and Kidnapping, II.B.
86, 2007 Utah Laws 339, § 11. Under the previous version of the aggravated kidnapping
statute, "[aggravated kidnapping [was] a first degree felony punishable by imprisonment
for an indeterminate term of not less than 6, 10, or 15 years and which may be for life].]"
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302 (2003) (amended 2007). Under the newly amended version
of the statute, "| aggravated kidnapping is a first degree felony punishable by a term of
imprisonment of. . . , not less than 15 years and which may be for life." Id. § 76-5302(3) (a) (2008). However, the trial court still retains the discretion to impose a
sentence of six or tcn-years-to-life:
If, when imposing a sentence under Subsection (3)(a)
or (b), a court finds that a lesser term than the term
described in Subsection (3)(a) or (b) is in the interest
of justice and states the reasons for this finding on the
record, the court may impose a term of imprisonment
of not less than:
(i) ten years and which may be for life:
or
(ii) six years and which may be for life.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302 (4) (i)-(ii) (2008).
At the same time the legislature amended the aggravated kidnapping statute, it also
removed the mandatory minimum sentencing procedures previously found in Utah Code
section 76-3-201. See Penalties for Sexual Offenses and Kidnapping, II.B. 86, 2007 Utah
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Laws 339, § 9 (removing Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (7), (8)). Under the prior version
of 76-3-201,
(i|f a statute under which the defendant was convicted
mandates that one of three stated minimum terms shall be
imposed, the court shall order imposition of the term of
middle severity unless there are circumstances in aggravation
or mitigation of the crime. The trial court must then
determine whether it is appropriate, in light of the
circumstances of an individual defendant, to vary from the
statutory presumption of the term of middle severity.

State v.KIm, 808 P.2d 1097, 1098-99 (Utah 1991) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Thus, under the old statutory scheme, when sentencing an individual for the crime of
aggravated kidnapping, the trial court was required to begin with the sentence of middle
severity, tcn-ycars-to-life, then consider aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and
state its reasons, on the record, for departing upwards or downwards from that sentence.
See [cL This statutory scheme prevented the trial court from exercising unfettered
discretion, it preserved the defendant's right to challenge the accuracy of the information
on which his sentences is based as well as the appellate court's ability to engage in
meaningful appellate review, and it helped inform criminal defendants of the potential
consequences for their criminal conduct.
While the new statutory scheme does not explicitly require the trial court to state
its reasons for imposing a particular sentence on the record, existing case law and due
process principles do so require. As previously mentioned, the due process clauses of the
state and federal constitutions and rule 22(a) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
extend fundamental principles of procedural fairness to criminal defendants at
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sentencing. See State v. Weeks, 2000 UT App 273, 12 P.3d 110, affd, 2002 UT 98, 61
P.3d 1000. While ,nthe sentencing judge| ] [has] discretion in determining what
punishment fits both the crime and the offender,' . . . [appellate courts] have consistently
sought 'to shore up the soundness and reliability of the factual basis upon which the judge
must rely in the exercise of that sentencing discretion.'" State v. Wanosik, 2001 UT App
241,1| 34, 31 P.3d 615, aiTd, 2003 UT 46, 79 P.3d 937 (first, second, and fourth
alterations in original) (quoting State v. Lipsky, 608 P.2d 1241, 1249 (Utah 1980)). In
keeping with these efforts, this court has explained "that a defendant [must] have the right
to examine and challenge the accuracy and reliability of the factual information upon
which his sentence is based." Weeks, 2000 UT App 273, ^| 8 (alteration in original)
(internal quotation marks omitted). In this instance, the trial court violated Mr. Gibbons's
procedural due process rights because it failed to articulate its factual basis for imposing
the maximum sentence because Mr. Gibbons is unable to challenge the information on
which his sentence his based, and this court cannot engage in meaningful review .
Other jurisdictions are likely to agree. For example, in Rita v. U.S., 127 S.Ct. 338
(2007), the United States Supreme Court stated that "sentencing judgefs] should set forth
enough to satisfy the appellate court that [they have] considered the parties' arguments
and [have] a reasoned basis for exercising [their] own legal decision making authority."
Id. at 2468. The Court further explained that this requirement reflects sound judicial
practice, even where the sentence at issue falls within the statutory guidelines:
| 1 ]hat requirement reflects sound judicial practice. Judicial
decisions are reasoned decisions. Confidence in a judge's use
of reason underlies the public's trust in the judicial institution.
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A public statement of those reasons helps provide the public
with the assurance that creates that trust. . . . By articulating
reasons, even if brief, the sentencing judge not only assures
reviewing courts (and the public) that the sentencing process
is a reasoned process but also helps that process evolve.
l± at 2468-69.l
Similarly, in United States v. Vowell 516 F.3d 503 (6th Cir.2008), the Sixth
Circuit recently explained that sentencing statements must be provided so that appellate
courts can engage in meaningful review: When sentencing a criminal defendant, a
district court is "require] d to] . . . explain "its reasoning to a sufficient degree to allow for
meaningful appellate review." Id. at 510 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also
U.S. v. Stern, — F.Supp.2d -—, 2008 WL 5273714, *3 (N.D. Ohio 2008) (quoting
Vowell, 516 F.3d at 510). Notwithstanding the fact that federal law requires sentencing
statements, the Sixth Circuit explained that a sentencing court "must set forth enough

1

While not mentioned in Rita v. U.S., 127 S. Ct. 338 (2007), sentencing statements also
reflect sound judicial practice because they require trial courts to pause and reflect prior
to advancing a sentence. As our state supreme court has explained,
The great majority of our laws and rules of evidence
pertaining to criminal trials seek to guarantee those accused
of criminal conduct their constitutional right to a fair trial
insofar as the determination of guilt is concerned. Fewer
safeguards exist which insure fairness in the punishment
phase, even though it is the punishment which in fact often
has a far more profound impact on a person than the finding
of guilt. The fair administration of justice at the least requires
that the information upon which the judge relics in imposing
punishment is accurate.
State v. Lipsky, 608 P.2d 1241, 1249 (Utah 1980). Where, as here, a court has the option
to sentence an individual to fiftcen-ycars-to-lifc in prison, pause and reflection prior to
sentence can only serve to ensure that this practice is undertaken in a well-reasoned
manner.
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facts to [demonstrate] that it [has] considered the parties' arguments and had a reasoned
basis for exercising its own legal decision making authority." Stern, 2008 WL 5273714,
*3 (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also United States v.
Vonner, 516 F.3d 382, 392-93 (6th Cir. 2008), cert, denied, 129 S. Ct. 68 (Martin, J.,
dissenting) ("I want to focus on the need for district courts to adequately explain the
reasons for a given sentence . . . regardless of whether the sentence is above, below, or
within the proposed guidelines range, so that we, as an appellate court, may adequately
review [those] sentences." (alternation in original)).
And in McCleary v. State, 182 N.W.2d 512 (Wis. 1971), the Wisconsin Supreme
Court held that "|t]he sentencing judge should be required in every case to state his
reasons for selecting the particular sentence imposed." IcL at 521 (emphasis added). In
reaching its conclusion, the court explained that
[i]n all Anglo-American jurisprudence a principal obligation
of the judge is to explain the reasons for his actions. His
decisions will not be understood by the people and cannot be
reviewed by the appellate courts unless the reasons for
decisions can be examined. It is thus apparent that requisite to
a prima facie valid sentence is a statement by the trial judge
detailing his reasons for selecting the particular sentence
imposed.
kh at 521-22.
Reflecting these same principals, in Anglcmycr v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482 (Ind.
2007), the Indiana Supreme Court recently held that a sentencing court should explain its
reasons for imposing a particular sentence for any felony offense

regardless of the fact

that the state's sentencing statutes do not require the same. See id. at 489-490 (holding
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that "Indiana trial courts arc required to enter sentencing statements whenever imposing
sentence for a felony offense"), fhe Anglcmcycr court was persuaded, in part, by the
fact that sentencing statements promote sound judicial policy. For example, the court
explained that even before any state statutes requiring sentencing statements existed,
Indiana courts had acknowledged that "sentencing statements served two primary
purposes: (1) they guarded against arbitrary and capricious sentencing, and (2) they
provided an adequate basis for appellate review." IdL at 489. Moreover, Indiana courts
have observed that sentencing statements further other important goals:
An attempt by the sentencing judge to articulate his [or her]
reasons for a sentence in each case should in itself contribute
significantly to the rationality and consistency of sentences.
A statement by the sentencing judge explaining the reasons
for commitment can help both the defendant and the public
understand why a particular sentence was imposed. An
acceptance of the sentence by the defendant without
bitterness is an important ingredient in rehabilitation, and
acceptance by the public will foster confidence in the criminal
justice system.
Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The Anglcmcycr court was also persuaded by the fact that while the state's
sentencing scheme did not require the court to acknowledge aggravating and mitigating
circumstances, it also did not prohibit the same. See idL at 490. As is the case here, the
Indiana sentencing court is entitled to enter a sentence different from the one
recommended by statute, so long as it explains its reasons for doing so in the record. The
court reasoned that the ability to depart from a particular sentence in the presence of
certain factors "suggests a legislative acknowledgement that a sentencing statement
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identifying aggravators and mitigators retains its status as an integral part of the trial
court's sentencing procedure." Id. Based on these principals, the Indiana Supreme Court
held that sentencing statements are required even where the sentence is within the
statutory guidelines. See id.
In addition to the policy considerations already mentioned, the court also reasoned
that sentences imposed within the statutory guidelines are subject to review for abuse of
discretion, and m[i]n order to carry out [the] function of reviewing the trial court's
exercise of discretion in sentencing, [the appellate court] must be told of [the] reasons for
imposing the sentence.'" I d (alteration in original) (quoting Page v. State, 424 N.E.2d
1021, 1023 (Ind. 1981)). More clearly, the court definitively held that "a trial court. . .
abusejs] its discretion [by] failing to enter a sentencing statement at all." Id.
Adding another perspective to this due process argument, in State v. Egbert, 748
P.2d 558 (Utah 1987), the Utah Supreme Court explained that a "fundamental tenet of
due process |i)s that 'fn]o one may be required at peril of life, liberty or property to
speculate as to the meaning of penal statutes.'" Id at 559 (quoting United States v.
Batchclder, 442 U.S. 114, 123 (1979)). The court further explained that '"vague
sentencing provisions may pose constitutional questions if they do not state with
sufficient clarity the consequences of violating a given criminal statute.'" I d (quoting
Batchelder, 442 U.S. at 123). In Egbert, the defendant had challenged the
constitutionality of the aggravated sexual assault statute, which allowed for three
potential sentences of five, ten, or fifteen-years-to-lifc, as being void for vagueness. See
[d at 561. The court rejected the defendant's argument on the basis that any potential
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vagueness was cured by the mandatory minimum sentencing procedures, which required
the court to begin with the sentence of middle severity and then explain its reasons for
moving up or down from that sentence. Id. at 559 ("Any vagueness to be found in
subsection 76-5-405(2), which provides for sentences of five, ten, or fifteen years and
which may be for life, is dispelled by the implementing language of Utah Code Ann. §
76-3-201(5) . . ., which plainly mandates imposition of the sentence of middle severity
unless there are circumstances in aggravation or mitigation of the crime. "). While the
vagueness and due process concerns at issue in Egbert were cured by the mandatory
minimum sentencing procedures, since those procedures have been repealed, the due
process concerns that Egbert raised exist in full today. See Penalties for Sexual Offenses
and Kidnapping, H.B. 86, 2007 Utah Laws 339, § 9 (removing Utah Code Ann. § 76-3201 (7), (8)).
Put another way, under the current version of the aggravated kidnapping statute,
the sentencing court has discretion to impose one of three sentences, yet it is no longer
bound by the mandatory minimum sentencing procedures. In other words there is no
explicit requirement for the court to begin with the sentence of middle severity, consider
aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and state its reasons for departing upwards or
downwards from that sentence. Without such requirements, a criminal defendant is left
only to "speculate as to the meaning of [the aggravated kidnapping] statute] ]," id. at 559,
the defendant is unable to examine and challenge the factual basis on which his sentence
is based, and the appellate court is unable to engage in meaningful review to determine
whether the court abused its discretion in fixing sentence. See, e.g., Rita v. U.S., 127
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S.Ct. 2468 (2007); United States v. Vowell 516 F.3d 503 (6th Cir.2008); Anglcmyer v.
State, 868 N.E.2d 482 (Ind. 2007); McCleary v. State, 182 N.W.2d 512, 521 (Wis.
1971)). To cure these defects as they now exist, the trial court should be required to
follow the procedures formerly dictated under the minimum mandatory sentencing
procedures- even if those procedures arc no longer explicitly required by statute.
This is especially so in a case such as this one where there was inaccurate and
irrelevant information before the court, the statute at issue provides for three potential
sentences, the defendant has argued for the lowest possible term, the defendant has only
one aggravating factor in his PSI, and he has presented extensive mitigating
circumstances, including, but not limited to, the fact that he has no prior felony criminal
or violent history, he has a supporting and loving family and he is capable of sustaining
meaningful employment. Because the trial court clearly failed to undertake these
proceedings at Mr. Gibbons's sentencing, this court should vacate his sentence and
remand for resentencing on the basis that the trial court violated Mr. Gibbons's due
process rights and abused its discretion.
IV.

The Trial Court Violated State and Federal Constitutional Law by
Sentencing Mr. Gibbons to Excessive Punishment

The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution states that "[e]xcessive
bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted." U.S. Const, amend. VIII. "Under the Eighth Amendment, '[a]
criminal punishment may be cruel and unusual when it is barbaric, excessive, or
disproportional to the offense committed.'" State v. Morrison, 2001 UT 73,11 28, 31 P.3d
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547 (quoting State v. Herrera, 1999 UT 64, ]\ 33, 993 P.2d 854). "Similarly, under article
I, section 9 of the Utah Constitution, a criminal punishment is cruel and unusual if the
punishment is so disproportionate to the offense committed that it shock[s| the moral
sense of all reasonable men as to what is right and proper under the circumstances." State
v. Herrera, 1999 UT 64, ]\ 33, 993 P.2d 854. In this case, the trial court committed plain
error and violated the state and federal constitution because it imposed a sentence that
was disproportionate to the offense committed and shocks the moral conscience.
Mr. Gibbons's sentence shocks the moral conscience because he received fiftccnycars-to-lifc for a crime that, while admittedly quite serious, did not involve death or
physical injury. In contrast, a defendant guilty of first degree murder is subject to the
same sentence, fifteen-years-to-life, see Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203(3)(b) (2008), while
an individual convicted of manslaughter may not be sentenced to more than fifteen years
in prison. Sec idL § 76-3-203(2) (2008); 76-5-201(5) (2008). While again, Mr. Gibbons's
crime was serious, it was relatively brief, was motivated by the desire for forty dollars,
and was carried out by an individual with no violent or felony criminal history. In
exchange for conduct, he has received a sentence of fiftecn-years-to-lifc in prison. Under
these circumstances, the sentence is excessive and disproportionate. This error should
have been obvious to the trial court because the court was clearly aware of Mr. Gibbons's
background and the facts surrounding the crime. And further, Mr. Gibbons has been
harmed by the court's error. Alternatively, this court can correct this error and vacate Mr.
Gibbons's sentence because the nature of the sentence, the crime committed, and Mr.
Gibbons's background combine to create exceptional circumstances.
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CONCLUSION
Based on the errors at sentencing, this court should vacate Mr. Gibbons's sentence
and remand to the trial court for additional proceedings at which the trial court can (1)
make appropriate findings regarding the relevancy and accuracy of the alleged errors in
the PSI; (2) base its sentencing decision solely on reasonable and reliable information in
accordance with due process principles; and (3) weigh aggravating and mitigating
circumstances and state its reasons on the record for imposing Mr. Gibbons's specific
sentence.

SUBMITTED this _\_ day of February, 2009.

DBBQJXAH KATZ LEVI
Attorney for Appellant
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Tab A

U.S. Const. Amend. VIII
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and
unusual punishments inflicted.

U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, § 1
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State whcr ein they reside. No State
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens
of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.

Utah Const A r t 1, § 7
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due proeess of
law.

Utah Const. Art. 1, § 9
Excessive bail shall not be required; excessive fines shall not be imposed; nor
shall cruel and unusual punishments be inflicted. Persons arrested or imprisoned shall not
be treated with unnecessary rigor.

UTAH R. CRIM. P. 22(e)
The court may correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in an illegal
manner, at any time.

UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-201 (2008)
§ 76-3-201. Definitions—Sentences or combination of sentences allowed—Civil penalties-llearing
(1) As used in this section:
(a) "Conviction" includes a:
(i) judgment of guilt; and
(ii) plea of guilty.
(b) "Criminal activities" means any offense of which the defendant is convicted or any
other criminal conduct for which the defendant admits responsibility to the sentencing
court with or without an admission of committing the criminal conduct.
(c) "'Pecuniary damages" means all special damages, but not general damages, which a
person could recover against the defendant in a civil action arising out of the facts or
events constituting the defendant's criminal activities and includes the money equivalent of property taken, destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, and losses including
earnings and medical expenses.
(d) "Restitution" means full, partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary damages to a
victim, and payment for expenses to a governmental entity for extradition or transportation and as further defined in Title 77, Chapter 38a, Crime Victims Restitution Act.
(e)(i) "Victim" means any person who the court determines has suffered pecuniary
damages as a result of the defendant's criminal activities.
(ii) "Victim" does not include any coparticipant in the defendant's criminal activities.
(2) Within the limits prescribed by this chapter, a court may sentence a person convicted
of an offense to any one of the following sentences or combination of them:
(a) to pay a fine;
(b) to removal or disqualification from public or private office;
(c) to probation unless otherwise specifically provided by law;
(d) to imprisonment;
'. 1

(e) on or after April 27, 1992. to life in prison without parole; or
(0 to death.
(3)(a) This chapter does not deprive a court of authority conferred by law to:
(i) forfeit property;
(ii) dissolve a corporation;
(iii) suspend or cancel a license;
(iv) permit removal of a person from office;
(v) cite for contempt; or
(vi) impose any other civil penalty.
(b) A civil penalty may be included in a sentence.
(4)(a) When a person is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in pecuniary damages, in addition to any other sentence it may impose, the court shall order that the defendant make restitution to the victims, or for conduct for which the defendant has agreed to
make restitution as part of a plea agreement.
(b) In determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court shall follow the criteria
and procedures as provided in Title 77, Chapter 38a, Crime Victims Restitution Act.
(5)(a) In addition to any other sentence the court may impose, the court shall order the
defendant to pay restitution of governmental transportation expenses if the defendant
was:
(i) transported pursuant to court order from one county to another within the state at
governmental expense to resolve pending criminal charges;
(ii) charged with a felony or a class A, B, or C misdemeanor; and
(iii) convicted of a crime.
(b) The court may not order the defendant to pay restitution of governmental transportation expenses if any of the following apply:
2

(i) the defendant is charged with an infraction or on a subsequent failure to appear a
warrant is issued for an infraction; or
(ii) the defendant was not transported pursuant to a court order.
(c)(i) Restitution of governmental transportation expenses under Subsection (5)(a)(i)
shall be calculated according to the following schedule:
(A) $75 for up to 100 miles a defendant is transported;
(B) $125 for 100 up to 200 miles a defendant is transported; and
(C) $250 for 200 miles or more a defendant is transported.
(ii) The schedule of restitution under Subsection (5)(c)(i) applies to each defendant
transported regardless of the number of defendants actually transported in a single
trip.
(d) If a defendant has been extradited to this state under Title 77, Chapter 30, Extradition, to resolve pending criminal charges and is convicted of criminal activity in the
county to which he has been returned, the court may, in addition to any other sentence it
may impose, order that the defendant make restitution for costs expended by any governmental entity for the extradition.
(6)(a) In addition to any other sentence the court may impose, and unless otherwise ordered by the court pursuant to Subsection (6)(c), the defendant shall pay restitution to the
county for the cost of incarceration in the county correctional facility before and after
sentencing if:
(i) the defendant is convicted of criminal activity that results in incarceration in the
county correctional facility; and
(ii)(A) the defendant is not a state prisoner housed in a county correctional facility
through a contract with the Department of Corrections: or
(B) the reimbursement docs not duplicate the reimbursement provided under Section
64-13e-104 if the defendant is a state probationary inmate, as defined in Section 6413e-102, or a state parole inmate, as defined in Section 64-13e-102.
(b)(i) The costs of incarceration under Subsection (6)(a) are the amount determined by
the county correctional facility, but may not exceed the daily inmate incarceration costs
'•'•
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and medical and transportation costs for the county correctional facility.
(ii) The costs of incarceration under Subsection (6)(a) do not include expenses incurred by the county correctional facility in providing reasonable accommodation for
an inmate qualifying as an individual with a disability as defined and covered by the
federal Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. 12101 through 12213, including medical and mental health treatment for the inmate's disability.
(c) In determining whether to order that the restitution required under this Subsection
(6) be reduced or that the defendant be exempted from the restitution, the court shall
consider the criteria under Subsections 77-38a-302 (5)(c)(i) through (iv) and shall enter
the reason for its order on the record.
(d) If on appeal the defendant is found not guilty of the criminal activity under Subsection (6)(a)(i) and that finding is final as defined in Section 76-1-304, the county shall
reimburse the defendant for restitution the defendant paid for costs of incarceration under Subsection (6)(a).
CRBDIT(S)
Laws 1973, c. 196. § 76-3-201; Laws 1979, c. 69. § 1; Laws 1981. c. 59, § 1; Laws 1983,
c. 85. § 1: Laws 1983. c. 88, § 3 : Laws 1984, c. 18. § LLaws 1986. c. 156, § l;Laws
1987, c. 107, § 1; Laws 1990. c. 81. S 1: Laws 1992. c. 142. § 1; Laws 1993. c. 17. 3 1;
Laws 1994. c. 13. 3 19; Laws 1995. c. 111, § 1. eff. May 1, 1995: Laws 1995. c. 117.
g 1. eff. May 1. 1995; Laws 1995, c. 301. 3 1, eff. May 1. 1995; Laws 1995, c. 337. §
1, eff. May 1. 1995; Laws 1995, 1st Sp.Sess., c. 10, 3 1. eff. April 29. 1996; Laws
1996, c. 40, § 1, eff. April 29, 1996; Laws 1996, c. 79, 3 98. eff. April 29, 1996; Laws
1996, c. 241. §§ 2, 3, eff. April 29, 1996; Laws 1998, c. 149. § 1, eff. May 4. 1998;
Laws 1999, c. 270. $ 15, eff. May 3, 1999; Laws 2001, c. 209. 3 1, eff. April 30, 2001;
Laws 2002, c. 35, 3 4. eff. May 6. 2002; Laws 2003, c. 280, 3 1. eff. May 5. 2003;
Laws 2006. c. 208. § 1. eff May 1, 2006: Laws 2007. c. 154. § 1, eff. April 30, 2007:
Laws 2007. c. 339, 3 3. eff. April 30. 2007; Laws 2007, c. 353, § 9, eff. April 30, 2007;
Laws 2008. c. 151. S 1. eff May 5. 2008.
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UTAH CODE ANN. 76-3-201 (2003)
76-3-201 Definitions —Sentences or combination of sentences allowed - Civil penalties
—Hearing.
(1) As used in this section:
(a) "Conviction" includes a:
(i) judgment of guilt; and
(ii) plea of guilty.
(b) "Criminal activities" means any offense of which the defendant is convicted or
any other criminal conduct for which the defendant admits responsibility to the sentencing court with or without an admission of committing the criminal conduct.
(c) "Pecuniary damages" means all special damages, but not general damages,
which a person could recover against the defendant in a civil action arising out of
the facts or events constituting the defendant's criminal activities and includes the
money equivalent of property taken, destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, and
losses including earnings and medical expenses.
(d) "Restitution" means full, partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary damages to a
victim, and payment for expenses to a governmental entity for extradition or transportation and as further defined in Title 77, Chapter 38a, Crime Victims Restitution
Act.
(c) (i) "Victim" means any person who the court determines has suffered pecuniary damages as a result of the defendant's criminal activities.
(ii) "Victim" does not include any coparticipant in the defendant's criminal activities.
(2) Within the limits prescribed by this chapter, a court may sentence a person convicted
of an offense to any one of the following sentences or combination of them:
(a) to pay a fine;
(b) to removal or disqualification from public or private office;
(c) to probation unless otherwise specifically provided by law;
1

(d) to imprisonment;
(e) on or after April 27, 1992, to life in prison without parole; or
(f) to death.
(3) (a) This chapter does not deprive a court of authority conferred by law to:
(i) forfeit property;
(ii) dissolve a corporation;
(iii) suspend or cancel a license;
(iv) permit removal of a person from office;
(v) cite for contempt; or
(vi) impose any other civil penalty,
(b) A civil penalty may be included in a sentence.
(4) (a) When a person is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in pecuniary
damages, in addition to any other sentence it may impose, the court shall order that
the defendant make restitution to the victims, or for conduct for which the defendant
has agreed to make restitution as part of a plea agreement.
(b) In determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court shall follow the criteria and procedures as provided in Title 77, Chapter 38a, Crime Victims Restitution
Act.
(5) (a) In addition to any other sentence the court may impose, the court shall order
the defendant to pay restitution of governmental transportation expenses if the defendant was:
(i) transported pursuant to court order from one county to another within the
state at governmental expense to resolve pending criminal charges;
(ii) charged with a felony or a class A, B, or C misdemeanor; and
(iii) convicted of a crime.
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(b) The court may not order the defendant to pay restitution of governmental transportation expenses if any of the following apply:
(i) the defendant is charged with an infraction or on a subsequent failure to appear a warrant is issued for an infraction; or
(ii) the defendant was not transported pursuant to a court order.
(c) (i) Restitution of governmental transportation expenses under Subsection
(5)(a)(i) shall be calculated according to the following schedule:
(A) $75 for up to 100 miles a defendant is transported;
(B) $125 for 100 up to 200 miles a defendant is transported; and
(C) $250 for 200 miles or more a defendant is transported.
(ii) The schedule of restitution under Subsection (5)(c)(i) applies to each defendant transported regardless of the number of defendants actually transported in a
single trip.
(d) If a defendant has been extradited to this state under Title 77, Chapter 30, Extradition, to resolve pending criminal charges and is convicted of criminal activity in
the county to which he has been returned, the court may, in addition to any other
sentence it may impose, order that the defendant make restitution for costs expended
by any governmental entity for the extradition.
(6) (a) In addition to any other sentence the court may impose, the court shall order
the defendant to pay court-ordered restitution to the county for the cost of incarceration in the county correctional facility before and after sentencing if:
(i) the defendant is convicted of criminal activity that results in incarceration in
the county correctional facility; and
(ii) (A) the defendant is not a state prisoner housed in a county correctional
facility through a contract with the Department of Corrections; or
(B) the reimbursement does not duplicate the reimbursement provided under
Section 64-13c-301 if the defendant is a state prisoner housed in a county
correctional facility as a condition of probation under Subsection 77-18-1(8).
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(b) (i) The costs of incarceration under Subsection (6)(a) are:
(A) the daily core inmate incarceration costs and medical and transportation
costs established under Section 64-13c-302; and
(13) the costs of transportation services and medical care that exceed the negotiated reimbursement rate established under Subsection 64-13c-302(2).
(ii) The costs of incarceration under Subsection (6)(a) do not include expenses
incurred by the county correctional facility in providing reasonable accommodation for an inmate qualifying as an individual with a disability as defined and
covered by the federal Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C.
12101 through 12213, including medical and mental health treatment for the inmate's disability.
(c) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for the court-ordered restitution under this Subsection (6), the court shall consider the criteria provided under
Subsections 77-38a-302(5)(c)(i) through (iv).
(d) If on appeal the defendant is found not guilty of the criminal activity under Subsection (6)(a)(i) and that finding is final as defined in Section 76- 1-304, the county
shall reimburse the defendant for restitution the defendant paid for costs of incarceration under Subsection (6)(a).
(7) (a) If a statute under which the defendant was convicted mandates that one of
three stated minimum terms shall be imposed, the court shall order imposition of the
term of middle severity unless there are circumstances in aggravation or mitigation
of the crime.
(b) Prior to or at the time of sentencing, either party may submit a statement identifying circumstances in aggravation or mitigation or presenting additional facts. If
the statement is in writing, it shall be filed with the court and served on the opposing
party at least four days prior to the time set for sentencing.
(c) In determining whether there arc circumstances that justify imposition of the
highest or lowest term, the court may consider the record in the case, the probation
officer's report, other reports, including reports received under Section 76-3-404,
statements in aggravation or mitigation submitted by the prosecution or the defendant, and any further evidence introduced at the sentencing hearing.
(d) The court shall set forth on the record the facts supporting and reasons for imposing the upper or lower term.

(c) In determining a just sentence, the court shall consider sentencing guidelines regarding aggravating and mitigating circumstances promulgated by the Sentencing
Commission.
(8) If during the commission of a crime described as child kidnapping, rape of a child,
object rape of a child, sodomy upon a child, or sexual abuse of a child, the defendant
causes substantial bodily injury to the child, and if the charge is set forth in the information or indictment and admitted by the defendant, or found true by a judge or jury at trial,
the defendant shall be sentenced to the highest minimum term in state prison. This Subsection (8) takes precedence over any conflicting provision of law.
History: C. 1953, 76-3-201, enacted by L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-3-201; 1979, ch. 69, § 1;
1981, ch. 59, § 1; 1983, ch. 85, § 1; 1983, ch. 88, § 3; 1984, ch. 18, § 1; 1986, ch. 156, §
1; 1987, ch. 107, § 1; 1990, ch. 81, § 1; 1992, ch. 142, § 1; 1993, ch. 17, § 1; 1994, ch.
13, § 19; 1995, ch. 111,§ 1; 1995, ch. 117, § 1; 1995, ch. 301, § 1; 1995, ch. 337, § 1;
1995 (1st S.S.), ch. 10, § 1; 1996, ch. 40, § i; 1996, ch. 79, § 98; 1996, ch. 241, §§ 2, 3;
1998, ch. 149, § 1; 1999, ch. 270, § 15; 2001, ch. 209, § 1; 2002, ch. 35, § 4; 2003, ch.
280, § 1.
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UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-302 (2008)
§ 76-5-302. Aggravated kidnapping
(1) An actor commits aggravated kidnapping if the actor, in the course of committing unlawful detention or kidnapping:
(a) possesses, uses, or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1601; or
(b) acts with intent:
(i) to hold the victim for ransom or reward, or as a shield or hostage, or to compel a
third person to engage in particular conduct or to forbear from engaging in particular
conduct;
(ii) to facilitate the commission, attempted commission, or flight after commission or
attempted commission of a felony;
(iii) to hinder or delay the discovery of or reporting of a felony;
(iv) to inflict bodily injury on or to terrorize the victim or another;
(v) to interfere with the performance of any governmental or political function; or
(vi) to commit a sexual offense as described in Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 4, Sexual Offenses.
(2) As used in this section, "in the course of committing unlawful detention or kidnapping" means in the course of committing, attempting to commit, or in the immediate
flight after the attempt or commission of a violation of:
(a) Section 76-5-301, kidnapping; or
(b) Section 76-5-304, unlawful detention.
(3) Aggravated kidnapping is a first degree felony punishable by a term of imprisonment
of:
(a) except as provided in Subsection (3)(b), (3)(c), or (4), not less than 15 years and
which may be for life;
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(b) except as provided in Subsection (3)(c) or (4), life without parole, if the trier of fact
finds that during the course of the commission of the aggravated kidnapping the defendant caused serious bodily injury to another; or
(c) life without parole, if the trier of fact finds that at the time of the commission of the
aggravated kidnapping, the defendant was previously convicted of a grievous sexual offense.
(4) If, when imposing a sentence under Subsection (3)(a) or (b), a court finds that a lesser
term than the term described in Subsection (3)(a) or (b) is in the interests of justice and
states the reasons for this finding on the record, the court may impose a term of imprisonment of not less than:
(a) for purposes of Subsection (3)(b), 15 years and which may be for life; or
(b) for purposes of Subsection (3)(a) or (b):
(i) ten years and which may be for life; or
(ii) six years and which may be for life.
(5) The provisions of Subsection (4) do not apply when a person is sentenced under Subsection (3)(c).
(6) Imprisonment under this section is mandatory in accordance with Section 76-3-406.
CRhDIl(S)
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-5-302; Laws 1974, c. 32, § 12; Laws 1983, c. 88, § 15: Laws
1995. c. 337. § 4, eff. May L 1995: Laws 1995. 1st Sp.Sess.. c. 10, $ 5. eff. April 29.
1996; Laws 1996, c. 40. $ 6, eff. April 29. 1996; Laws 1998. c. 69. § 2, eff. May 4.
1998; Laws 200 L c. 301. § 4. ciT April 30. 2001; Laws 2007. c. 339. § 1 L eff April
30., 2007.
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UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-18-1 (2008)
§77-18-1. Suspension of sentence-Pleas held in abeyance-Probation—SupervisionPresentence investigation-Standards-Confidentiality-Terms and conditionsTermination, revocation, modification, or extension-Hearings-Electronic monitoring
(1) On a plea of guilty or no contest entered by a defendant in conjunction with a plea in
abeyance agreement, the court may hold the pica in abeyance as provided in Title 77,
Chapter 2a, Pleas in Abeyance, and under the terms of the plea in abeyance agreement.
(2)(a) On a plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, no contest, or conviction of any crime
or offense, the court may, after imposing sentence, suspend the execution of the sentence
and place the defendant on probation. The court may place the defendant:
(i) on probation under the supervision of the Department of Corrections except in cases of class C misdemeanors or infractions;
(ii) on probation with an agency of local government or with a private organization; or
(iii) on bench probation under the jurisdiction of the sentencing court.
(b)(i) The legal custody of all probationers under the supervision of the department is
with the department.
(ii) The legal custody of all probationers under the jurisdiction of the sentencing court
is vested as ordered by the court.
(iii) The court has continuing jurisdiction over all probationers.
(3)(a) The department shall establish supervision and presentence investigation standards
for all individuals referred to the department. These standards shall be based on:
(i) the type of offense;
(ii) the demand for services;
(iii) the availability of agency resources;
(iv) the public safety; and
(v) other criteria established by the department to determine what level of services
shall be provided.
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(b) Proposed supervision and investigation standards shall be submitted to the Judicial
Council and the Board of Pardons and Parole on an annual basis for review and comment prior to adoption by the department.
(c) The Judicial Council and the department shall establish procedures to implement the
supervision and investigation standards.
(d) The Judicial Council and the department shall annually consider modifications to
the standards based upon criteria in Subsection (3)(a) and other criteria as they consider
appropriate.
(c) The Judicial Council and the department shall annually prepare an impact report and
submit it to the appropriate legislative appropriations subcommittee.
(4) Notwithstanding other provisions of law, the department is not required to supervise
the probation of persons convicted of class B or C misdemeanors or infractions or to conduct presentence investigation reports on class C misdemeanors or infractions. However,
the department may supervise the probation of class B misdemeanants in accordance with
department standards.
(5)(a) Prior to the imposition of any sentence, the court may, with the concurrence of the
defendant, continue the date for the imposition of sentence for a reasonable period of
time for the purpose of obtaining a presentence investigation report from the department
or information from other sources about the defendant.
(b) The presentence investigation report shall include a victim impact statement according to guidelines set in Section 77-38a-203 describing the effect of the crime on the victim and the victim's family.
(c) The presentence investigation report shall include a specific statement of pecuniary
damages, accompanied by a recommendation from the department regarding the payment of restitution with interest by the defendant in accordance with Title 77, Chapter
38a, Crime Victims Restitution Act.
(d) The presentence investigation report shall include:
(i) findings from any screening and any assessment of the offender conducted under
Section 77-18-1.1; and
(ii) recommendations for treatment of the offender.
2

(e) The contents of the presentence investigation report, including any diagnostic evaluation report ordered by the court under Section 76-3-404, are protected and are not
available except by court order for purposes of sentencing as provided by rule of the
Judicial Council or for use by the department.
(6)(a) The department shall provide the presentence investigation report to the defendant's attorney, or the defendant if not represented by counsel, the prosecutor, and the
court for review, three working days prior to sentencing. Any alleged inaccuracies in the
presentence investigation report, which have not been resolved by the parties and the department prior to sentencing, shall be brought to the attention of the sentencing judge, and
the judge may grant an additional ten working days to resolve the alleged inaccuracies of
the report with the department. If after ten working days the inaccuracies cannot be resolved, the court shall make a determination of relevance and accuracy on the record.
(b) If a party fails to challenge the accuracy of the presentence investigation report at
the time of sentencing, that matter shall be considered to be waived.
(7) At the time of sentence, the court shall receive any testimony, evidence, or information the defendant or the prosecuting attorney desires to present concerning the appropriate sentence. This testimony, evidence, or information shall be presented in open court on
record and in the presence of the defendant.
(8) While on probation, and as a condition of probation, the court may require that the
defendant:
(a) perform any or all of the following:
(i) pay, in one or several sums, any fine imposed at the time of being placed on probation;
(ii) pay amounts required under Title 77, Chapter 32a, Defense Costs;
(iii) provide for the support of others for whose support the defendant is legally liable;
(iv) participate in available treatment programs, including any treatment program in
which the defendant is currently participating, if the program is acceptable to the
court;
(v) serve a period of time, not to exceed one year, in a county jail designated by the
department, after considering any recommendation by the court as to which jail the
court finds most appropriate;
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(vi) serve a term of home confinement, which may include the use of electronic monitoring;
(vii) participate in compensatory service restitution programs, including the compensatory service program provided in Section 76-6-107.1;
(viii) pay for the costs of investigation, probation, and treatment services;
(ix) make restitution or reparation to the victim or victims with interest in accordance
with Title 77, Chapter 38a, Crime Victims Restitution Act; and
(x) comply with other terms and conditions the court considers appropriate; and
(b) if convicted on or after May 5, 1997:
(i) complete high school classwork and obtain a high school graduation diploma, a
GED certificate, or a vocational certificate at the defendant's own expense if the defendant has not received the diploma, GED certificate, or vocational certificate prior
to being placed on probation; or
(ii) provide documentation of the inability to obtain one of the items listed in Subsection (8)(b)(i) because o[\
(A) a diagnosed learning disability; or
(B) other justified cause.
(9) The department shall collect and disburse the account receivable as defined by Section 76-3-201,1, with interest and any other costs assessed under Section 64-13-21 during:
(a) the parole period and any extension of that period in accordance with Subsection 7727-6(4); and
(b) the probation period in cases for which the court orders supervised probation and
any extension of that period by the department in accordance with Subsection (10).
(10)(a)(i) Probation may be terminated at any time at the discretion of the court or upon
completion without violation of 36 months probation in felony or class A misdemeanor
cases, or 12 months in cases of class B or C misdemeanors or infractions.
(ii)(A) If. upon expiration or termination of the probation period under Subsection
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(10)(a)(i), there remains an unpaid balance upon the account receivable as defined in
Section 76-3-201.1, the court may retain jurisdiction of the case and continue the defendant on bench probation for the limited purpose of enforcing the payment of the
account receivable.
(B) In accordance with Section 77-18-6, the court shall record in the registry of civil
judgments any unpaid balance not already recorded and immediately transfer responsibility to collect the account to the Office of State Debt Collection.
(iii) Upon motion of the Office of State Debt Collection, prosecutor, victim, or upon
its own motion, the court may require the defendant to show cause why the defendant's failure to pay should not be treated as contempt of court.
(b)(i) The department shall notify the sentencing court, the Office of State Debt Collection, and the prosecuting attorney in writing in advance in all cases when termination of
supervised probation will occur by law.
(ii) The notification shall include a probation progress report and complete report of
details on outstanding accounts receivable.
(1 l)(a)(i) Any time served by a probationer outside of confinement after having been
charged with a probation violation and prior to a hearing to revoke probation does not
constitute service of time toward the total probation term unless the probationer is exonerated at a hearing to revoke the probation.
(ii) Any time served in confinement awaiting a hearing or decision concerning revocation of probation does not constitute service of time toward the total probation term
unless the probationer is exonerated at the hearing.
(b) The running of the probation period is tolled upon the filing of a violation report
with the court alleging a violation of the terms and conditions of probation or upon the
issuance of an order to show cause or warrant by the court.
(12)(a)(i) Probation may not be modified or extended except upon waiver of a hearing by
the probationer or upon a hearing and a finding in court that the probationer has violated
the conditions of probation.
(ii) Probation may not be revoked except upon a hearing in court and a finding that
the conditions of probation have been violated.
(b)(i) Upon the filing of an affidavit alleging with particularity facts asserted to constitute violation of the conditions of probation, the court that authorized probation shall
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determine if the affidavit establishes probable cause to believe that revocation, modification, or extension of probation is justified.
(ii) If the court determines there is probable cause, it shall cause to be served on the
defendant a warrant for the defendant's arrest or a copy of the affidavit and an order to
show cause why the defendant's probation should not be revoked, modified, or extended.
(c)(i) The order to show cause shall specify a time and place for the hearing and shall be
served upon the defendant at least five days prior to the hearing.
(ii) The defendant shall show good cause for a continuance.
(iii) The order to show cause shall inform the defendant of a right to be represented by
counsel at the hearing and to have counsel appointed for him if the defendant is indigent.
(iv) The order shall also inform the defendant of a right to present evidence.
(d)(i) At the hearing, the defendant shall admit or deny the allegations of the affidavit.
(ii) If the defendant denies the allegations of the affidavit, the prosecuting attorney
shall present evidence on the allegations.
(iii) The persons who have given adverse information on which the allegations are
based shall be presented as witnesses subject to questioning by the defendant unless
the court for good cause otherwise orders.
(iv) The defendant may call witnesses, appear and speak in the defendant's own behalf, and present evidence.
(c)(i) After the hearing the court shall make findings of fact.
(ii) Upon a finding that the defendant violated the conditions of probation, the court
may order the probation revoked, modified, continued, or that the entire probation
term commence anew.
(iii) If probation is revoked, the defendant shall be sentenced or the sentence previously imposed shall be executed.
(13) The court may order the defendant to commit himself to the custody of the Division
of Substance Abuse and Mental 1 lealth for treatment at the Utah State Hospital as a con6

dition of probation or stay of sentence, only after the superintendent of the Utah State
Hospital or the superintendent's designee has certified to the court that:
(a) the defendant is appropriate for and can benefit from treatment at the state hospital;
(b) treatment space at the hospital is available for the defendant; and
(c) persons described in Subsection 62A-15-610(2)(g) are receiving priority for treatment over the defendants described in this Subsection (13).
(14) Presentence investigation reports, including presentence diagnostic evaluations, are
classified protected in accordance with Title 63G, Chapter 2, Government Records
Access and Management Act. Notwithstanding Sections 63G-2-403 and 63G-2-404, the
State Records Committee may not order the disclosure of a presentence investigation report. Except for disclosure at the time of sentencing pursuant to this section, the department may disclose the presentence investigation only when:
(a) ordered by the court pursuant to Subsection 63G-2-202(7);
(b) requested by a law enforcement agency or other agency approved by the department
for purposes of supervision, confinement, and treatment of the offender;
(c) requested by the Board of Pardons and Parole;
(d) requested by the subject of the presentence investigation report or the subject's authorized representative; or
(e) requested by the victim of the crime discussed in the presentence investigation report or the victim's authorized representative, provided that the disclosure to the victim
shall include only information relating to statements or materials provided by the victim, to the circumstances of the crime including statements by the defendant, or to the
impact of the crime on the victim or the victim's household.
(15)(a) The court shall consider home confinement as a condition of probation under the
supervision of the department, except as provided in Sections 76-3-406 and 76-5-406.5.
(b) The department shall establish procedures and standards for home confinement, including electronic monitoring, for all individuals referred to the department in accordance with Subsection (16).
(16)(a) If the court places the defendant on probation under this section, it may order the
defendant to participate in home confinement through the use of electronic monitoring as
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described in this section until further order of the court.
(b) J he electronic monitoring shall alert the department and the appropriate law enforcement unit of the defendant's whereabouts.
(c) The electronic monitoring device shall be used under conditions which require:
(i) the defendant to wear an electronic monitoring device at all times; and
(ii) that a device be placed in the home of the defendant, so that the defendant's compliance with the court's order may be monitored.
(d) If a court orders a defendant to participate in home confinement through electronic
monitoring as a condition of probation under this section, it shall:
(i) place the defendant on probation under the supervision of the Department of Corrections;
(ii) order the department to place an electronic monitoring device on the defendant
and install electronic monitoring equipment in the residence of the defendant; and
(iii) order the defendant to pay the costs associated with home confinement to the department or the program provider.
(e) The department shall pay the costs of home confinement through electronic monitoring only for those persons who have been determined to be indigent by the court.
(0 The department may provide the electronic monitoring described in this section cither directly or by contract with a private provider.
CRKDIT(S)
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SEPTEMBER 19,

2008;

9:40

a.m.

PROCEEDINGS
•

THE COURT:

*

*

Your Honor, this is Brandon Gibbons.

Mike Peterson representing him.
THE COURT:

Did I get appearances?

MS. COLLINS:

Chou Chou Collins for the State.

MR. PETERSON:

Your Honor, do you have the

pre-sentence report in this case?
THE COURT:

I do.

MR. PETERSON:
matters.

Your Honor, I need to correct two

First, on form one in the report, the addendum at the

end, the score that the AP&P agent has indicated of 11 is
incorrect because they list a score of two for prior felony
convictions.

As you can see from the attached pre-sentence

report out of Judge Roth f s court, Mr. Gibbons has no prior
felony convictions and, therefore, he scores a zero in that
category.
THE COURT:

Unfortunately, I didn f t get an

attachment.
MR. PETERSON:

Your Honor, if I may approach?

Itfs

just the brief class A misdemeanor report out of Judge Roth!s
court.

It f s plain from that attachment that Mr. Gibbons has no

prior felony record and, therefore, has a zero in that category
and his total score is nine.

3

The other thing I needed to correct was a
misperception that occurred when the pre-sentence report
writer, Nathan Eldridge, was communicating with the named
victim in this case.

On page four, the second paragraph from

the bottom, there was some indication that Mr. Gibbons had
somehow been proud about this misdemeanor case out of Judge
Roth f s court.

What I want to clarify there is this, your

Honor, he wasn ! t proud about pleading a third degree down to a
class A.

In fact, that was just a standard offer for a

possession case.

What he expressed to the agent was that he

took some measure of satisfaction and pride in the fact that he
completed the CATS program and then was beginning the CATS
after care.

And that's the only concept that he was trying to

convey to Nathan Eldridge which, unfortunately, in his
communications with the named victim somehow got misconstrued
about being proud that he got a class A off of a third, or
something along those lines.
Your Honor, with those two corrections in place as
you know from the outset when we entered this plea we come
before you, number one, on a mandatory prison case.

The issue

for the Court today is six to life, ten to life, or 15 to life.
We're asking the Court to please look at the option of a six to
life commitment here, because this is a first felony offense
for Mr. Gibbons, albeit very serious.

But also because, Judge,

as you can see from the pre-sentence report that you have, and
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the one from Judge Roth's court, and from the outpouring of
family and community support letters that you received in this
case, Mr. Gibbons obviously has a long standing, problematic,
troubling history with substance abuse.
And he thought that he had gotten that somewhat well
in check going through the Judge Roth case, getting the CATS
program done, the after care.
obvious relapse.

But, unfortunately, there was an

Mr. Gibbons freely acknowledges in his

statement to the Court in this report that he had been using
for a significant period, even while on Judge Roth f s class A
probation, that he had become dope sick, that he had called
home to try and get some money.

That didn't work out.

And that in this sort of dope sick desperation he
found a broken bottle in a parking lot area and held it up to
this named victim.

I want to reiterate something I said at the

time of the change of plea, Judge, and that is that Mr. Gibbons
in no way, shape, or form minimizes how serious this conduct
is, and how tremendously traumatic this was to Alana Heaps, and
the kind of psychological difficulty he has caused her.

He

realizes this is going to take significant counseling and other
forms of assistance in her life.
He wants the Court to know, the State and Ms. Heaps
to know how awful he feels about that conduct.

His intention,

Judge, was basically to get her between the bottle and the car
and see if he could get $40 or $50 from her wallet.

That was
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the idea, but what ended up happening was he ordered her into
the car.

Realizing there was no cash in the wallet, he then

ordered her to drive out to an ATM.
He admits he looked through the wallet, Judge, found
an ATM card, realized what branch it was to and said, okay,
this is where we're driving to.

AP&P suggests in one sentence

in this report that Mr. Gibbons really truly didn't take
responsibility or proper remorse for this case, but I beg to
differ significantly.

Because when he entered his plea, he

plead to a mandatory imprisonment case.
knew could carry 15 to life.

He plead to a case he

He did not force this case into a

trial when some other clients in other states of denial may
have.

He took a very tough plea bargain.

Ms. Collins will be

the first to admit that he took a tough plea deal here,
subjecting himself to a long stretch in prison.
But what he did not do ever, was ever deny the
essential facts of what he did to Ms. Heaps.
time that I was his lawyer onwards.

At least from the

He may have said something

initially to a detective that wasn't straightforward, but from
the day he and I were engaged in this case through the court
system he has fully acknowledged what he has done.

He has

always said let's plea bargain this for the best offer that we
can get, and that's what we did.

So, Judge, I think on balance

when you look at the family and friends' support letters, and
I've probably given you a migraine, I just kept sending them to
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you every other day as they came in.

They talk about Brandon

Gibbons who grew up in a safe, structured middle class
environment where he excelled in his church activities, where
he excelled in his scouting activities.

And then,

unfortunately, around 16 or so he fell in with a different
group and he started using.

And a couple of the wheels have

flown off since then and he ! s battled this addition for some
period of time.
But fundamentally what these letters talk about is a
very caring and kind, compassionate human being who, when he is
not under the influence or drug seeking, doesn't do anything
remotely like this.
past.

He does not have crimes of violence in his

So I f m asking the Court to put Mr. Gibbons in a position

with the Board of Pardons with a six to life where they have
all the options available to them, depending on what he does to
prove himself inside the system.
If you look at his matrix, Judge, he scores at an
eight year time frame for parole eligibility.

There's no

question -THE COURT:

Let me ask you this though, wasn't he on

parole at the time?
MR. PETERSON:

He was not.

He was on probation to

Judge Roth on a class A after completing CATS inpatient -THE COURT:

So he wasn't a fugitive.

Well, it says

he was a fugitive.
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MR. PETERSON:

He had absconded from his AP&P

probation, but it was on a class A misdemeanor.

The reason

you're looking at him right now, your Honor, in a prison suit
is because when he went to the order to show cause with Judge
Roth, he told the judge I will do my year in the prison.

The

reason he told Judge Roth that, over Ms. Stam's objection, was
that he knew this case was coming.

And he knew he was going to

prison on this case, so he got out there to start his
treatment.

And the good news is, Judge, he is now in a wing of

the prison where he's doing just that.

He's engaging in active

treatment for his issues.
But back to my point.

With the matrix suggesting an

eight year date prior to parole consideration, I'm asking the
Court to impose the sentence in the six to life time frame
rather than the ten to life or 15 to life so then the Board
does have the maximum leverage and they don't feel like they're
handcuffed by this Court's sentence being ten to life or 15 to
life.

And if he were to prove himself the way I think that he

can in the kinds of programming, the Conquest drug program,
etcetera.

I appreciate Ms. Heaps will be appearing at his

parole hearings and will be speaking about the traumatic nature
of this event.

And fine, that's appropriate and sobeit.

But

at least then the Board has all of its ability to act and react
according to Ms. Heaps' input and to Mr. Gibbons track record.
THE COURT:

Ms. Collins.
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MS. COLLINS:

Your Honor, the victim is here and she

wishes to speak to the Court.
THE COURT:

Okay.

MS. COLLINS:

Will you have her come up?

Yes.

Your Honor, this is Elaine Heaps.

THE COURT:

Okay.

Go ahead.

MS. HEAPS:

I'm a little bit bothered by the idea of

just having a six to life term after what I went through that
day.

I mean, I have to sit and think about what if my babies

would have been in the back seat and I hadn't been at work that
day?

Or when I was sitting on 90th South staring straight

across from a cop, and having him tell me to drive careful so
that we didn't get picked up.

And I was trying to figure a way

to wreck the car so at least my body would get found that day,
because I honestly didn't think that I was going to live after
we picked up his friend, or whatever we were going to do.
And if it was all about just needing treatment, and
just wanting treatment or whatever, he could have asked me to
stop.

He had a thing from Odessey House on the front seat of

the car.

And I had hid everything else from my work there

because I thought that was going to make it worse.
could have asked me to take him to treatment.

But he

He wouldn't have

got picked up.
He could have asked to go to the hospital.
offered him to go to the hospital.
what I need.

They

He said, they don't have

So I don't think that -- it doesn't feel like to
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me at all if it was about needing help and wanting help.
was a horrible day.

It

And I work at the Federal Courthouse.

I

have to talk to people every day in the front lobby, and I have
issues doing it now.

Smells make me almost sick.

Things are

just crazy.
I have a really hard time thinking that there was
three charges, pleading to one.

The reason he plead to that

one is because I didn't agree —

I said we'll go to trial if he

doesnf t plead to that one.
happened.

Thatf s the main thing that

I don't care about what he took from my ATM. I don't

care whatever else.
I care that I had to sit and look at the clock and
think that I'm supposed to pick my babies up from daycare in an
hour and I'm not ever going to see them again.
to life is not asking a whole lot.

So I think 15

And I think within that 15

years, or however long, he can get all the treatment that he
needs.

And he can maybe sit there and think what it's like to

wonder if you're going die in the next five minutes or not.
THE COURT:

Is that it?

MS. COLLINS:

Okay, thank you.

Your Honor, with what the victim just

said we will submit.
THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. PETERSON:

Mr. Peterson, anything else?

Judge, just that Mr. Gibbons intent

here was to get $40 or $50 to go get dope.

His intent was not

to harm in any way, shape or form.
10

THE COURT:

Well, she didn't know that.

MR. PETERSON:

I know.

But the reality is he didn't

threaten to take a life.
THE COURT:

That's not the deal, Mr. Peterson.

It's

what was in her mind, not his mind.
MR. PETERSON:

I understand.

But I am suggesting

what was conveyed during that ride was not a risk of death.
THE COURT:
going to kill you.

Well, I don't think he needed to say I'm
It was the way she was receiving what he

was doing.
MR. PETERSON:

Theref s no doubt, Judge.

I'm not

trying to minimize that at all.
THE COURT:

And I'm glad she came in because it makes

a big difference to me.

I'm going to sentence him to an

indeterminate term of 15 years to life and take him forthwith.
(Whereupon the record was closed at 9:50 a.m.)
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SEP-11-2008 THU 10:26 AM 3rd DISTRICT COURT

FAX NO, 8012387404

P. 02

3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs.

Cape No: 081901519 FS

BRANDON MICHAEL GIBBONS,
Defendant.

Judge:
Date;

WILLIAM W. BARRETT
August 18, 2 00 8

PRESENT
Clerk:
torij
Prosecutor: COLLINS, CHOU CHOU
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): PETERSON, MICHAEL A
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: December 15, 1983
Video
Tape Count: 11:40
CHARGES
2. AGGRAVATED KIDNAPING - 1st Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 07/01/2008 Guilty
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of AGGRAVATED KIDNAPING a 1st
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term
of not less than fifteen years and which may be life in the Utah
State Prison,
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the
defendant will be confined.
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